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A
mAbstract
A relationship between banks and firms that emphasizes the qualitative aspects of
the enterprises may represent a response to the increasing difficulties of the credit
system in financing a business system in which the intangible assets are the main
source of value. In this view, an empirical survey on 61 bank managers of large and
small banks has been carried out to verify the following: (1) the role of quantitative
and qualitative information in the financing of large companies and small and
medium enterprises and (2) how the relationship between bank and firm varies
together with the dimensional change of the actors involved in the credit
relationship.
Keywords: Relationship lending, Soft information, Hard information, Mann–Whitney testBackground
The development of the Italian economy in the 1950s and 1960s was based on large com-
panies in the Fordist structure, designed to meet ‘mass needs’ of yet immature con-
sumers. The sophistication of market demand, which occurred in the years after the
‘economic miracle’, prompted a revision of the production model based on economies of
scale in favour of more flexible manufacturing systems (Rullani 2004). This caused the
crisis of large companies and facilitated the development of small and medium enter-
prises (SMEs), organized in districts that found their strength in production specialization
and, at the same time, flexibility.
The phenomenon of disintegration of large companies, confined to areas that require
economies of scale, has not only concerned Italy but also all the developed countries.
However, in our country, this event has acquired particularly intense features if it is
pointed out that, according to the latest available data, the average company size is about
40% below the European average and is in constant decline (Eurostat 2002). This has gen-
erated an extensive debate on the implications of the dwarfism of the entrepreneurial sys-
tem in Italy’s development. In particular, the Italian family business, closed to venture
capital, organized in districts and specialized in the so-called Made in Italy according to
some scholars, does not appear adequate to withstand international competition of the
most technologically advanced countries. It must however be noted that, in most cases,
the system of Italian district SMEs has not opposed or replaced the large companies, but
it has joined the latter producing on their behalf and satisfying the need to outsource cer-
tain activities (Becattini 2000; Becattini et al. 2001). Therefore, the Italian production sys-
tem is now dominated by a complex network of SMEs, which often form the linked
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constant element: the support of the credit system. Since the 1950s, commercial banks
have been the protagonists of business development financing, first by encouraging the
birth and development of large companies and then the growth of SMEs and their indus-
trial districts. Italy has always been defined as a ‘bank-centred’ system in which the role of
financial market risk capital is marginal. Commercial banks, through collection and use of
operations, are an important ‘infrastructure’ of the national economy, as they invest the
considerable amount of national savings in the business system (Allen and Gale 2000).
However, even the banking system has undergone profound structural and regulatory
changes in the last 20 years that have had controversial effects on bank-firm relationship
(Rajan and Zingales 2003). Following the mergers and acquisitions that characterized the
1990s and the first half of the 2000s, the credit system has gradually concentrated, pursu-
ing objectives of economies of scale and greater efficiency but moving the decision-
making centres away from the operational centres (Ozbas 2005). In fact, the directorates
general of large banking groups born from extraordinary transactions are located in social
and economic contexts that are very different from those where branch offices located in
geographically distant areas operate.
Various studies show that bank gigantism has, therefore, made necessary the
standardization of bank credit processes and at the same time decreased the decisional
autonomy of branch managers who know better the context in which they operate
(Alessandrini et al. 2009). Thus, compared to the past, those intangible assets that are be-
yond the standardized assessment based almost exclusively on quantitative data of eco-
nomic and financial nature are less important in the assessment of creditworthiness. This
has increased the complexity of the relationship between the large banking groups and
small and medium businesses that base their success on their intangible assets (Itami and
Thomas 1987), but it seems to have favoured the financing of large firms characterized by
a greater capacity to generate quantitative information (Berger et al. 1998).
At the same time, regulatory changes introduced between 1989 and 1990 and culmi-
nated in 1993 with the Consolidated Banking Act, allowing the establishment of new
banks and liberalizing the opening of new branches, have generated a phenomenon of dif-
fusion of the credit system in the territory through the opening of new small local banks
(people’s banks, cooperative banks) whose decision-making centres are very close to their
operational centres. In this case, the local banks are ‘immersed’ in the territory and are
able to collect information about the qualitative aspects of small business owners that are
difficult to quantify in a standardized system of creditworthiness assessment (Bonaccorsi
di Patti and Gobbi 2001).
On the contrary, small banks have greater difficulty in providing particularly complex fi-
nancial services to large enterprises at a competitive cost. The process of specialization
that has led small banks to mainly finance SMEs and wider size banks to preferentially
open credit lines to large enterprises (Berger et al. 2005) is also confirmed by some empir-
ical studies carried out in Italy.
In particular, Di Salvo et al. (2004), in a survey on a sample of 1,700 enterprises (most of
which were SMEs), show that in the period 2000 to 2002, a significant number of entre-
preneurs started relationships with small local banks because of the customer’s proximity
to the intermediary. Moreover, in the period 1996 to 2005, the market share of these
credit intermediaries rose from 24% to 31% of total loans. The outlined evolution of bank-
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question: what is the role of quantitative and qualitative information in large banks and
small banks to assess the creditworthiness of large firms and SMEs?
This article attempts to provide an answer to the question, which has important implica-
tions. Understanding what role do quantitative and qualitative information play in small
banks in the assessment of different size enterprises and whether the same variables are
adopted by large banks to evaluate the same categories of firms allows understanding the
causes of the process of specialization in the banking industry. Besides the introduction,
the article is thus divided into other six sub-sections. The first section deals with the theor-
etical debate on the role of information in the credit market, while the second gains insight
into the advantages and limitations of relational finance in the collection of information.
The third section describes the objective of the research and the survey variables, while the
fourth explains the statistical test used for the empirical analysis. In the fifth section, the re-
sults of the investigation are commented, while the last section is devoted to conclusions.
Theses on the role of information in the credit market
The theory of financial intermediation highlights the aims of lending institutions to reduce
information asymmetries between deficit units (borrowers) and surplus units (savers),
since confidential information accumulated within stable and long-term credit line rela-
tionships with customers is available (Sharpe 1990; Stein 2002; Von Thadden 2004).
Therefore, the credit market would be more efficient in allocating resources than the
broader financial market because the establishment of more stable and long-lasting rela-
tionships would allow credit intermediaries to reduce the costs associated with moral haz-
ard and adverse selection (Fama and Jensen 1983; James 1987; Fudenberg et al. 1990).
Thus, the greater creation of value within the credit relationship consists in the activities
of constant selection and control carried out by the bank towards credit applicants.
However, it must be pointed out that among the scholars of financial intermediation,
there are two main schools of thought on how to create value attributable to the activ-
ities of selection and control of information (Corigliano 2007): The thesis on absolute comparative advantage according to which banks benefit from
economies of scale resulting from carrying out in a professional manner activities of
selection and control of creditors. In this way, the techniques adopted by
intermediaries allow obtaining benefits from the information on creditors that
outweigh the costs of screening and monitoring. Other lenders in the financial market
(venture capital, investment funds) are not able to reach a ‘critical mass of customers’
capable of achieving the same economies of scale. Therefore, in the credit market, the
cost of reducing information asymmetries between the lender and borrower is lower
compared to the broader financial market. In this case, the standardized assessment
models of creditworthiness allow banks to gain a competitive advantage from the very
first contact with the customer. Therefore, according to this theoretical approach, even
within individual credit relationships based on single financing transactions but not
intended to open up the business to the bank, the intermediary has a cost advantage
over other lenders. These relationships are called transaction banking or arm’s length
financing (Boyd and Prescott 1986; Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1984; Diamond 1984).
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an immediate competitive advantage in terms of cost of collecting information from
other lenders. This benefit derives, however, from the information gradually acquired
during a stable and long-lasting relationship with the client, gaining access to
confidential information. Therefore, as the length of the relationship increases, the
incremental cost of additional information acquired by the bank decreases, and in this
way, the bank manages to fund the firm more efficiently. According to this view, the
value created by the credit relationship lies not only in quantitative information
(balance sheets, financial reports) but also in qualitative information collected by the
bank on the credit applicant. These relationships are called relationship lending
(Hodgman 1961; Sharpe 1990; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Boot and Thakor 1994;
Berlin and Mester 1992, 1999; Boot 2000; Ongena and Smith 2000; Corigliano 2007).
With regard, however, to the firms that are bank customers, many scholars have ob-
served that the progressive ‘dematerialization’ of business assets that have a strong influ-
ence on the generation of value has determined the inadequacy of the technologies
adopted by banks for the collection of information. In fact, the increased importance of
intangible capital in the firms has created for the banks the problem of collecting informa-
tion on that particular factor of production and its quantification.
A scarcely intense and short-lasting credit relationship does not allow an efficient col-
lection of this qualitative information (Fudenberg et al. 1990). Furthermore, no statistical-
mathematical model is able to effectively quantify this type of news.
Obviously, the difficulties of collecting information on intangible capital are different in
large firms than small and medium sized (SMEs). Large firms have a greater capacity to
generate information and a greater market visibility. Credit intermediaries can sometimes
even indirectly access qualitative information about the company, catching the signalling
of the industry in which the company operates (Banks and Sobel 1987; Brighi 2006).
Small- and medium-sized enterprises are, however, more opaque with regard to the
informational aspect. Catching the signals of the industry to understand some qualita-
tive aspects of the firm is impossible because in that case entrepreneurial action has no
readily detectable influences on the market. Access to quality and confidential informa-
tion can only occur through a direct source.
However, although with varying degrees of intensity, the evolution toward dema-
terialization of strategic assets, both of large companies and SMEs, requires an ap-
proach between bank and firm that seems to call into question the thesis on relative
comparative advantage.
Advantages and limitations of relationship lending in the collection of information on
large enterprises and SMEs
The evolution of the credit market that occurred in recent years has led to a general
sharing of the thesis on relative comparative advantage. Based on these considerations,
the most recent researches in the field of bank intermediation have focused on the ana-
lysis of the following:
 The advantages and limitations of credit relationships characterized by repeated
interactions and costly investments by banks to acquire confidential information on
the firm that requires financing (relationship lending).
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Corigliano 2007; Schmeits 2002; Padilla and Pagano 1997; Elsas 2005;
Berger and Udell 1995, 2002; Degryse and van Cayseele 2000; Ongena and
Smith 2000).
Studies on relationship lending have highlighted that medium- to long-term credit re-
lationships with frequent information interactions between the creditor and debtor
allow the revision of the conditions applied to the customer not only in an ameliorative
sense but also in a pejorative way (Berlin and Mester 1992).
In this case, the discretion and flexibility of the credit relationship, allowing the
adjustment of credit conditions to new information difficult to verify, lead to more
efficient investment decisions by the funded firms (Mustilli 1995; Corigliano 2007;
Schmeits 2002). Therefore, relationship lending may be a factor that drives
companies to create more value by choosing the best investment (Padilla and
Pagano 1997).
Furthermore, the possibility to collect qualitative information of a confidential nature
allows the credit system to increase its allocative efficiency. However, according to some
authors, the benefits of relationship lending are of greater or lesser intensity depending
on the size of the actors involved in the credit relationship (Elsas 2005; Berger and Udell
2002; Degryse and van Cayseele 2000).
In particular, large bank groups may not find it convenient to make expensive invest-
ments in order to acquire sensitive information on SMEs. The informational benefits
arising from a relationship characterized by relationship lending may not offset the
costs of collecting information. Large banks may opt for a strategy of diversifica-
tion of their customer portfolio in order to reduce the specific risk of each expos-
ure to SMEs.
The convenience of a costly investment to collect confidential information may be,
however, greater for decisions of opening credit lines to large enterprises, considering
the amount of loans. In this way, larger credit intermediaries could be encouraged to
adopt different approaches towards small- and medium-sized enterprises and large
companies: transaction banking towards SMEs and relationship lending towards large
enterprises.
However, the attitude of small banks towards small- and medium-sized enterprises may
be different. In this case, SMEs account for almost all of the bank credit, and the benefits
of investment in acquiring quality and confidential information may not only offset the
costs of its collection but also those resulting from potential default of a portfolio almost
exclusively made by SMEs (Berger and Udell 1995).
Furthermore, small banks will adopt however an approach based on relationship lend-
ing, whatever the size of the client firm. This is because the relevant exposures to large
companies make it convenient for small banks to bear the cost of collecting confidential
information. However, the different compositions of the customers of large banks com-
pared to those of smaller size justify a different attitude of intermediaries towards relation-
ship lending. Despite the undoubted advantages that relationship lending gives in the
collection and processing of confidential information, it should be emphasized that some
hidden pitfalls may nullify the benefits.
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et al. 1989; Sharpe 1990; Rajan 1992) and creditor capturing (soft budget constraint)
(Boot 2000; Bolton and Scharfstein 1996; Dewatripont and Maskin 1995).
The first phenomenon is attributable to the effects of information monopoly of the lend-
ing bank on the funded enterprise. If, on the one hand, the exclusivity of a unique relation-
ship with the bank, typical of relationship lending, creates the conditions for the offer of
an implicit insurance service because the bank is ready to grant emergency credit lines in
case of a liquidity crisis (Corigliano 2007) by virtue of a fiduciary relationship, it exposes,
on the other hand, the firm to the risk that the bank may increase interest rates indiscrim-
inately dispossessing it of part of its profits (Greenbaum et al. 1989; Sharpe 1990; Rajan
1992) . Several authors have shown that the risk of hold up can be appropriately mitigated
through multiple credit lines and sharing of information with other banks (Bannier 2007;
Thakor 1996), though reducing the benefits associated with relationship lending.
The phenomenon of creditor capturing occurs, instead, when the entrepreneur under-
stands that excessive exposure of the bank towards him does not give further credibility
to the threat of revoking bank credits that have been granted (Corigliano 2007). This situ-
ation encourages opportunistic behaviour by the actor that has received funds.
Another field of study of relationship lending regards the nature of information that may
be collected during the credit relationships. Hard information is distinguished from soft in-
formation (Petersen 2004; Goetzmann et al. 2009; Liberti 2004). Hard information is readily
available and quantifiable because it arises from official and public documents (balance
sheets, financial reports and press releases) (Petersen 2004). This type of information is pro-
duced with high frequency and reliability by large companies that, given the great number
of stakeholders, need to make the performance they have achieved visible to the market.
Less frequent and reliable is the production of information by SMEs which have small-
size administrative functions. Furthermore, the lowest number of SME stakeholders re-
duces the external pressure for the release of hard data relating to firm performance.
Instead, soft information is qualitative and difficult to obtain because of its confidential
nature (Petersen 2004; Liberti 2004). The news, in fact, relates to the future strategies of
the firm, the future projects under development, the research and development activities
that the firm intends to carry out and the managerial skills and leadership of the entrepre-
neur. In this case, soft information is difficult to obtain in both large enterprises and SMEs
because it relates to the potential growth of the enterprise and is also very appealing to
the competition among firms (Faure-Grimaud et al. 2003).
Therefore, relationship lending seems to play a key role in obtaining hard and, above all,
soft information regarding credit applicants (Uzzi 1999). However, some distinctions seem
to emerge between large enterprises and SMEs. In the first case, relationship lending al-
lows obtaining mainly soft information, as the hard is already available in large quantity.
Instead, in the case of SMEs, relationship lending also allows the collection of hard infor-
mation, considering the increased opacity of such firms.
Therefore, a situation emerges in which the relational approach of large intermediaries
towards larger firms and SMEs is different from the one adopted by small banks because
of the following:
 Large banks may opt for a strategy of risk reduction of their customer portfolio
made by SMEs through an appropriate diversification and, instead, find convenience
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this last case the benefits arising from the possession of confidential information
exceed the cost of its collection. Moreover, the interest of large banks should be
focused on the collection of soft information considering the large amount of
quantitative information produced by large firms and available at low cost.
 Small banks must necessarily adopt a relational approach regardless of the size of
the firms because SMEs account for almost all of the exposures.
Therefore, it is important to ensure that the portfolio of SMEs does not become too
risky altogether, while a few but significant exposures to large companies also recommend
making large investments in the collection of confidential information regarding such cli-
ents. In this case, small banks are interested in collecting hard and soft information with
regard to SMEs while employing resources to collect only soft information on large
enterprises.Results and discussion
In order to better highlight the differences between large size intermediaries and small
banks in the assessment of hard and soft information relating to large companies and
SMEs, it was deemed appropriate to focus the review of the results on the information
variables that show a statistically significant difference in medians (significance less
than 0.1) according to the Mann–Whitney test.
Regarding the quantitative information on large companies (Table 1), the 2010 data
point out the following:
 Large bank managers attach high importance to information from the central credit
register, while they assign a medium-high importance to information on granted
guarantees.
 Small bank managers attach less importance to information from the central credit
register and a high relevance to guarantees (Table 1).
Regarding the quantitative information on SMEs (Table 1), the survey results show,
however, the following:
 Large bank managers attach an average relevance to the trend analysis of the credit
relationship and a great importance to guarantees.
 Small bank managers assign high relevance to the performance of the credit relationship
and a high relevance to guarantees. For the remaining information variables related to
large companies and SMEs, the Mann–Whitney test shows no statistically significant
differences between the managers of large banks and small banks.From these observations, a picture emerges in which large and small banks appear to
show a similar approach with respect to quantitative variables, regardless of the size of the
firms they are granting credit to. Moreover, the differences observed in 2010, in most
cases, are not found in 2007 (Table 2). In that year, in fact, only the information variables
regarding SMEs show statistically significant differences.
Table 1 Degree of relevance of quantitative information in the year 2010














Balance sheets 4 4 159.5 0.316 3 3 172 0.420
Territorial data 4 3 157.5 0.302 3 3 143 0.120
Central credit register 4 3 65 0.0 3 3 171 0.449
Credit relationship 4 4 169.5 0.503 3 4 97.5 0.003
Guarantees 3 4 78 0.01 4 4 111.5 0.018



















Table 2 Degree of relevance of quantitative information in the year 2007














Balance sheets 3 4 143 0.2387 4 3 46 0.000
Territorial data 4 4 175.5 0.8668 3 4 153.5 0.385
Central credit register 3 4 168 0.6978 3 3 146.5 0.238
Credit relationship 4 3 148 0.2898 3 4 130 0.064
Guarantees 3 4 158.5 0.4046 4 4 130 0.107
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ered most relevant by large banks, while information on the progress of the relationship
between bank and enterprise (credit relationship) is deemed most important by small
banks (Table 2). In the latter case, the greater sensitivity of small bank managers to infor-
mation on the trend of the credit relationship with SMEs is confirmed.
The substantial homogeneity between large banks and small banks in the evaluation of
quantitative information in order to grant credit to companies of all sizes is not confirmed
when the same credit institutions have to assess qualitative information. In fact, almost all
the medians of qualitative information variables show statistically significant differences
between large banks and small banks (Table 3).
This occurs both when the firms entitled to bank credit are large and when they are
SMEs. In particular, small banks in evaluating the creditworthiness of large firms attach
high importance to private information, brand image, the organization’s quality and the
reliability of the information produced by the information system, R & D, entrepreneurial
culture, and relationship length, and such information greatly influences the determin-
ation of credit pricing (Table 3).
Large banks, instead, attach little importance to the same information. Even with regard
to SMEs, smaller banks appear to show greater interest in qualitative information than
large banks. In most cases, in fact, smaller financial intermediaries deem relevant qualita-
tive information relating to SMEs in order to grant a credit line (Table 3).
Less attention, instead, has been declared by large bank managers to this type of infor-
mation produced by SMEs. Furthermore, the different approach of large intermediaries
compared to small banks towards qualitative information is confirmed by the 2007 data
(Table 4). Small banks deem the soft information relevant to the assessment of the credit-
worthiness of both large and small firms (Table 4).
Instead, large banks consider this kind of information scarcely relevant on businesses of
any size. In summary, analysis of the results of the interviews shows the following:
 Managers of large banks base their analysis of firm creditworthiness on quantitative
information (hard information), while they judge qualitative information (soft
information) scarcely relevant, regardless of the size of the firms requiring a credit line.
 Managers of small intermediaries believe both quantitative and qualitative information
are relevant to assess the creditworthiness of both large firms and SMEs.Conclusions
The empirical investigation seems to confirm some of the assumptions of the literature
on relationship lending, outlining better some of its features. In particular, the data
confirm the existence of a different information approach by large bank managers com-
pared to small banks managers. The empirical analysis seems to show the indifference
of the great institutions towards the collection of qualitative information regardless of
the size of the firms requiring a credit line. Therefore, both large companies and SMEs
are valued by the larger credit institutions only on the basis of quantitative information.
The information approach of small banks appears to be different: they assess with the
same attention both qualitative and quantitative aspects of the firms regardless of
their size.
Table 3 Degree of relevance of qualitative information in the year 2010


















Private information 2 4 48.5 0.0000 3 4 102 0.0060
Brand image 2 4 29.5 0.0000 3 4 102 0.0080
Information system organization 3 4 33.5 0.0000 3 4 46 0.0000
R & D 3 4 120.5 0.0344 4 4 153 0.2410
Entrepreneurial culture 2 4 34 0.0000 2 3 54.5 0.0000
Pricing 3 4 61.5 0.0002 3 4 126 0.0520
Relationship length 2 4 80 0.0011 2 3 118 0.0250



















Table 4 Degree of relevance of qualitative information in the year 2007


















Private information 3 4 53 0.0001 2 4 9 0.0000
Brand image 3 4 57 0.0001 3 4 59 0.0000
Information system organization 3 4 44.5 0.0000 2 4 29.5 0.0000
R & D 3 4 52.5 0.0001 2 4 58.5 0.0000
Entrepreneurial culture 2 4 38 0.0000 2 3 9.5 0.0000
Pricing 2 3 125 0.0530 2 3 79 0.0010
Relationship length 2 3 150 0.2297 3 4 67.5 0.0000
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of an efficient diversification of the customer portfolio that is inevitably concentrated on a
territorial basis and, sometimes, also on an industrial basis. This obliges small intermedi-
aries to pay more attention to firms enhancing the knowledge of the qualitative aspects.
Instead, the specialization of large banks in the assessment of hard information, may find
its explanation in the need for standardization of the assessment processes.
However, the current crisis and the consequent increase in the frequency of default
events, not only of entire entrepreneurial systems but also of entire countries, should lead
larger credit intermediaries to pay more attention to relationship lending, investing more
decisively in the collection of qualitative information on their customers in debt. By co-
ordinating only this activity of soft information collection and by constantly developing
quantitative models for the assessment of hard information, an improvement in the qual-
ity of customer portfolios may be achieved, stabilizing the credit market.Methods
The aim of the survey is to assess whether large credit institutions attach different import-
ance to qualitative information (soft information) and quantitative information (hard in-
formation) compared to small banks, when they have to assess the creditworthiness of
large companies and SMEs. Therefore, it is necessary to study the attitudes of large bank
managers with regard to quantitative and qualitative information from enterprises of dif-
ferent sizes and compare this phenomenon with the behaviour of small bank managers.
For this reason, a questionnaire regarding firms which had been granted credit lines in
the period 2007 to 2010 was administered to a sample of 61 managers of various banks
throughout the national territory (29 large banks and 31 small banks).
In particular, managers were asked to express an opinion on the relevance of certain
categories of quantitative information (hard information) and qualitative information
(soft information) in order to assess the creditworthiness of large firms and SMEs.
The questionnaire was structured using the Likert scale with six increasing scores: 1 =
no relevance of the information, 2 = low relevance, 3 = average relevance, 4 = high rele-
vance, 5 = very high relevance and 6 = decisive relevance to the opening of the credit line.
Relevance assessment primarily focused on ‘hard information’ variables as defined in
the following: balance sheets indicates the relevance of financial statements in the assess-
ment of the firm’s reliability by the bank manager, territorial data measures the relevance
of quantitative data related to the territory (GDP per capita, infrastructure, etc.) on the as-
sessment of firm creditworthiness, central credit register detects the influence of the news
about exposures detectable by the central credit register on the manager’s decisions to
grant credit, credit relationship indicates the relevance of the trend of the credit relation-
ship between the firm requesting credit and the bank granting it regarding the decision it-
self and guarantees measures the importance of economic and financial information on
those who have provided personal guarantees and collateral in the debtor’s interest.
Moreover, relevance assessment has also focused on the ‘soft information’ variables as
specified in the following: private information measures the importance attached by banks
to information on the firm’s performance released by the entrepreneur himself or by those
close to him such as the stakeholders, pricing measures the influence exerted by qualita-
tive information on the determination of credit pricing, brand image measures the
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tem organization measures the influence of information on the quality of the business
organization and the information system on credit decisions, R & D indicates the import-
ance attached by the banks to the news on investment in research and development and
the existence of partnerships with universities or research centres; entrepreneurial culture
measures the importance attached by bank managers to information such as the age of
the entrepreneur, his qualifications, the governance system and the entrepreneurial leader-
ship that represent a proxy for business problem-solving skills and relationship length
measures the relevance to managers of the length of the lending relationship.
In this research, given the small sample size, the nonparametric Mann–Whitney test
was used to highlight significant differences between the responses provided by large
bank managers and those provided by small bank managers with regard to the variables
described previously.
The Mann–Whitney test
The Mann–Whitney U test (Mann and Whitney 1947) or robust rank-order test is a
nonparametric statistical test (it does not require a priori assumptions about the char-
acteristics of the population) and is equivalent to t statistics for independent samples. It
is used to test the null hypothesis that two samples come from the same population
(the same median) or, alternatively, if the observations belong to two different popula-
tions (different medians).
The Mann–Whitney test arises from H. B. Mann and D. R. Whitney’s proposal to
generalize Wilcoxon’s method (Wilcoxon 1945) and requires no assumptions about the
symmetry of the two samples. Moreover, it can also be applied when the two samples
have different sizes. The Mann–Whitney test is divided into the following steps:
Step 1. Sorting data in ranksa (r), including the two samples in the same order. If
samples are not balanced, we say that the size of the smallest sample is n and the size
of the largest is m. The sum of the ranks of the two samples is as follows:
X
r
¼ nþmð Þ nþmþ 1ð Þ
2
: ð1Þ
The null hypothesis of random assortment of values in the two groups provides thatboth groups have the same mean rank rm:






Multiplying the mean rank by the respective sample sizes, the sum of the ranksexpected for the condition of indifference is obtained.
Step 2. Summing the ranks of the smaller sample (U). This amount is already the re-
sult of the test. In fact, the more the sum of the ranks of the smaller sample differs
from the expected one, the more the probability that the two samples are random as-
sortments of rank-loss consistency. The verification in the table will tell us whether to
keep or reject the null hypothesis beyond the different critical thresholds of signifi-
cance. For each level of significance, two extreme values are inscribed in the table: a
very small and a very large one. The significance is reached if U is smaller than the
smallest value or higher than the highest value in the table. If the samples are large
Campanella et al. Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship 2013, 2:17 Page 15 of 16
http://www.innovation-entrepreneurship.com/content/2/1/17enough, it is possible to do without the table and exploit the fact that U tends to be
normally distributed around the expected value of the null hypothesis:
zU ¼ U−mUsU ; ð3Þ
where
mU ¼ n nþmþ 12 ¼ nrm; ð4Þ
sU ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ




Formulas 4 and 5 are respectively the mean rank multiplied by the sample size of thefirst group and the standard deviation. If zU exceeds in absolute value of 1.96, the two
groups may be considered significantly different.
Endnotes
aThe rank represents the increasing ordered position of observations.
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